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Abstract 
This paper describes and analyses the resource constrained 
situation of a reformed public enterprise, the Fiji Hardwood 
Corporation Limited, given the mistrust between the various enti-
ties. The paper uses the Resource Dependence theory to explain 
and analyse the performance of this company unitl 2011. It con-
cludes that the landowners on whose land the lucrative resource 
of mahogany is planted have been wary of benefits to them from 
the processing of this resource. This generated significant mis-
trust thereby affecting the company's performance. The paper 
highlights the significant role which resource providers play in 
performance of enterprises which rely on these resources. 
 
 
Introduction 
 
 Public Enterprise Reform (PER) is no new phenomenon. PER pro-
grammes first began in the UK in the late 1970s. Since then, state inter-
vention in the market has been increasingly challenged. Such a challenge 
acquired a more ideological form with the rise of the ultra-conservative 
governments in the UK as well as the USA. Not limited to the developed 
world, PER has become the hallmark of public policy making throughout 
the world, including the underdeveloped nations (Narayan, 2005). 
 Public/state enterprises have generally been criticised because they 
are, supposedly, often subsidised by their governments, operate in losses 
ultimately borne by taxpayers, provide inferior goods and services, re-
strict choice of consumers, and remain static (Yaqub, et al., 2011). Ac-
cordingly, the proponents of reforms recommend that public enterprises 
be placed on a full commercial footing independent of political directives, 
be fully compensated for community service obligations and be exposed 
to competition with strict budget constraints and full accountability (An-
ere, 2009). According to the ADB, public enterprises can be successfully 
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reformed if subjected to the discipline practiced in the private sector 
(Jaine, 2011). Agencies such as ADB and the World Bank often extend 
loans with reform related conditions requiring the debtor countries to re-
form and obtain returns from their public enterprises. As such, reforms 
have been undertaken worldwide to enhance performances of public en-
terprises.  
 However, over the years PER has attracted both commendation as 
well as condemnation. Whereas efficiency, effectiveness and efficacy be-
came the catchphrases justifying reforms, over the years considerable de-
bate emerged between the reform critics and the advocates over reform 
issues and effects. As countries began to implement reforms, a large part 
of such debate was fuelled by the outcomes of reforms and, in many 
cases, by the evidence of failed experiments (Narayan, 2005).  
 Radical critics of reforms argue that reforms have not resulted in 
what was promised. Reforms have either led to no improvement at all or 
have proved to be socially costly. Those in favour of state created enter-
prises defend the state. Kumar (2010), for example, argues that while the 
key arguments of inefficiency, corruption and liability of public enter-
prises are true to some extent, such ills also plague the private sector. He 
expresses that public enterprises are not problematic but potentially im-
portant players in economies. He argues that during the most recent 
global financial crisis, it was the public money and the governmental 
agencies that came forward to salvage the collapsing economies. He 
states that these are the very economies that stood guided by monopoly 
capitalism and neoliberal ideology and asserts that the recent defeat of the 
neoliberal experiments has put public enterprises and their contributions 
towards societal welfare on the spotlight. Thus, a strong case is made for 
governments to keep some industries under their ownership; these can 
also provide automatic checks on the private sector and provide safe-
guards against private sector exploitation (Yaqub, et al., 2011). 
 At the other end, PER advocates label the above as state capitalism. 
Schuman (2011) highlights the case of Russia claiming it to be a state 
capitalist, strangling its economy. He explains that government spending 
as well as the size of civil service is increasing in Russia, crowding out 
the private sector, with private capital taking flight out of Russia since its 
becoming harder to do business in that economy. He argues that even 
though it is true that free capitalism has fallen on hard times, a better 
system has not yet emerged. State capitalism is not the solution (2011: 2). 
 Overall, literature on PER points out that, encouraged and financed 
by donor agencies, developing countries have undertaken reforms of their 
public enterprises aimed at improving their performances. Literature also 
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provides clear evidence that reforms have not corrected the ills of all pub-
lic enterprises the world across, giving rise to the question - why is it that 
reforms fare well in certain public enterprises while others remain 
plagued. This research has been undertaken against this backdrop. 
 Like other countries, Fiji has also tried to reform its public enter-
prises. Governments of Fiji since the 1980's, except the Fiji Labour Party-
led Government (May 1999-May 2000), have been pro-World Bank re-
forms. The PER process in Fiji was initiated by the Rabuka-led Soqosoqo 
Vakavulewa ni Taukei (SVT) Government after the 1987 coups. The 
process of reforms commenced in the mid-1980s but was delayed due to 
the uncertainty created in the economy following the two 1987 military 
coups. Since then, except for the brief May 1999-May 2000 period, the 
PER mantra has been a part of government policy making. 
 Since then, the number of studies done on PER has also been rising. 
Thus far, research has been done for the following: Airports Fiji Limited 
(Snell, 2000; McMaster 2001; Singh, 2002), Customs and Excise De-
partment (Chand, 1999), Fiji Pine Limited (Reddy, 1997, 1998), Fiji Post 
and Telecommunications Limited (Reddy, 1997, 1998), Fiji Sugar Corpo-
ration (Reddy, 2003; Lal and Rita, 2005; Reddy and Kumari, 2007; Ku-
mari, 2007), Government Shipyard and Public Slipways (McMaster 2001; 
Narayan, 2005, 2008), Housing Authority (Nath, 2000; Sharma and Ho-
que, 2002), Inland Revenue Department (Chand, 1999), National Bank of 
Fiji (Reddy, 1998; Chandra et al., 2004; Lodhia and Burritt, 2004), Ports 
Authority of Fiji (Singh, 2002) and Public Rental Board (Sharma and 
Lawrence, 2005). Most of these studies have focused on reform imple-
mentation and their aftermath. But wider studies have also been done. 
Chand (1999, on Inland Revenue Department and Customs and Excise 
Department), and Nath (2000, on Housing Authority), for example, fo-
cused on performance management systems in the public sector.  
 Whereas the findings and recommendations of the studies done so 
far are worth noting, many of these studies remain weak in certain re-
spects. Many are broad-based (Appana (2003), Sarker and Pathak (2003), 
Appana (2005), Amosa (2010) and Narayan (2010g)). Many are also si-
lent or weak on theoretical explanations which are needed to put empiri-
cal studies into perspective (Reddy, 1997, 1998, 2003; Snell, 2000; 
McMaster, 2001; Sarker and Pathak, 2003; McMaster and Nowak, 2005; 
Narayan, 2008, 2009a, 2009b, 2010a, 2010b, 2010c, 2010d, 2010f, 
2010g, 2011; Narayan and Reddy, 2009; and Karan, 2010). Some notable 
exceptions, however, are Chand (1999), who used socio-cultural perspec-
tives; Sharma and Hoque (2002), who used institutional theory; Sharma 
and Lawrence (2005), who used the new institutional sociology and the 
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technical-rational perspectives; Amosa (2010), who used the principal-
agent theory, and Narayan (2010e), who used the theoretical debate be-
tween agency and structure. 
 This paper uses the Resource Dependence theory to examine the 
data on a poor performing reformed public enterprise, the Fiji Hardwood 
Corporation Limited. The study provides evidence that the reform efforts 
have not resulted in better performance but enraged and created doubts in 
the minds of the resource owners, a key stakeholder.  
 This paper also responds to previous calls for more empirical work 
on PER in developing country contexts (Sharma and Lawrence, 2005: 3), 
and answers calls for careful reviews of public sector management prac-
tices in such economies to further substantiate the claim of failures of 
New Public Management (Lodhia and Burritt, 2004). Given the reform 
related transformations currently underway in Fiji’s public enterprises, 
studies such as these have policy implications. While progress with re-
structuring of public enterprises has been limited in recent years, Fiji is 
preparing several of these enterprises for greater private sector involve-
ment and is also looking into corporatisation of some government func-
tions (ADB, 2011). This study can thus, provide practitioners, policy 
makers as well as donors with insights on teh various factors that affect 
performances of public enterprises. 
 The performances of public enterprises as assessed by the Fiji Gov-
ernment and the ADB particularly centres on economic and/or financial 
indicators without elaborate explanations on why individual reformed 
public enterprises underperform and, specifically on the links of the en-
terprises with key resource providers. It is argued that financial data alone 
is just hard quantitative data which cannot capture the reasons behind per-
formances (Lusthaus et al., 2002). This research examines the perfor 
mance of the Fiji Harwood Corporation Limited (FHCL), a corporatised 
public enterprise. At the time of the research (2013) the FHCL was rid-
dled with numerous problems, operated in losses or generated insignifi-
cant profits and was uable to pay dividends to the government. 
 Upon corporatisation, a public enterprise gets termed in Fiji as a 
Government Commercial Company (GCC), becoming a wholly govern-
ment-owned corporatised enterprise. It is generally financed through gov-
ernment equity and/or debt.  
 A number of public sector researchers (such as Dufour, 1991; Hadi 
and McBride, 2000; Sharma and Hoque, 2002; Erakovic and Wilson, 
2006; Guerreiro et al., 2006; Amosa, 2010; Narayan, 2010e) have applied 
the Resource Dependence theory. This paper examines the FCLH in light 
of the key premises of the Resource Dependence theory. 
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Methodology 
 
 This research used qualitative research methods. Data was gathered 
through in-depth face-to-face interviews, and relevant primary and secon-
dary data. It used purposive sampling. This sampling began with a pur-
pose in mind with a specific and pre-defined group. The researcher inter-
viewed a key senior official at the Ministry of Public Enterprises, Tour-
ism and Communications (MPETC) three times. FHCL related reports; 
plans and ministerial correspondences, memorandums, brochures and 
magazines that were available were examined to formulate certain FHCL-
specific questions for interviews and to cross-check on interviewee re-
sponses and documents. Cabinet decisions, ministerial speeches, legisla-
tion and parliamentary reports were also sought. Secondary sources used 
were journal articles, textbooks, conference proceedings, theses and dis-
sertations, newspapers and the internet. Both, published as well as the un-
published sources were referred to. 
 The investigation began with publicly available sources which were 
analysed before the face-to-face interview sessions. The second process 
was the actual interview process. The name of interviewee is not dis-
closed in this paper for ethical reasons, to ensure anonymity and for em-
ployment security of the interviewee. After the interviews, information 
disclosed by the interviewee was rephrased in a summative manner. This 
was done to correct inaccuracies and to ensure that the receiving, under-
standing and interpretation of information was the same as expressed by 
the interviewee. It is acknowledged that certain information would have 
been withheld during the interviews due to job security reasons and be-
cause of confidentiality reasons. Thus, information was thoroughly cross-
referenced between interviewee responses and various reports, papers and 
studies for data authenticity.  
 The paper used Gillham’s (2001) analytical framework for re-
cording, verification and analysis of data whereby substantive relevant in-
formation was highlighted while irrelevant materials were put aside from 
the collected data. The data set was revisited to highlight substantive 
statements that might have been missed out in the first reading. Data 
analysis is based on content analysis.  
 Resource Dependence theory is one of the many theories of 
Organisational Studies. This theory is sometimes referred to as a political 
economy model of organisational behaviour, given its emphasis on politi-
cal behaviour and the role of power (Greenwood, 2008). The theory was 
formalised in the 1970s with the publication of Pfeffer and Salancik’s 
book The External Control of Organisations: A Resource Dependence 
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Perspective (1978). 
 Johnson (1995) states that this theory has its roots in social science, 
and gives credit to Emerson (1962) and Blau (1964) on their early work 
which highlighted the notion of power whereby social actor ‘A’ will de-
pend on actor ‘B’ to the extent ‘B’ controls some resource ‘A’ values and, 
to the extent ‘A’ is unable to obtain this resource from anyone else.  
 While many names have been associated with the development of 
the Resource Dependence theory (such as Zald, 1970; Hasenfeld, 1972; 
Jacobs, 1974; Benson, 1975; Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978, and Johnson, 
1995), the work of Thompson (1967) is one of the earliest attempt to ex-
amine this matter (Johnson, 1995). Thompson (1967) examined the in-
flow of resources into organisations and explained the effects of uncer-
tainty associated with this in-flow of resources.  
 Overall, a key assumption of the Resource Dependence theory is 
that the subject organisation will respond to and become dependent on 
other organisations (resource providers) that control its critical resources 
(Johnson, 1995). Resource Dependence theorists argue that the other or-
ganisations that provide critical resources to the subject organisations 
have direct or indirect power over these subject organisations (Katz et al., 
2002). This theory shows how critical resources needed by the dependent 
organisation can affect its survival and function (Johnson, 1995). Brether-
ton and Chaston (2005) discuss the link between this theory and perform-
ance of organisations and conclude that inadequate level of critical re-
sources and capital can lead to organisational underperformance while 
adequate levels of critical resources can lead to sustainable competitive 
advantage and superior performance.  
 The key assumption of the Resource Dependence theory can be 
clearly linked to a public enterprise’s performance. For instance, the or-
ganisation that provides key resources will be more powerful than the de-
pendent organisation given that as a supplier it owns and controls the 
critical resources. In the case of a public enterprise, if the critical re-
sources are raw materials or inputs to the production process, then the 
production process of the public enterprises will be adversely affected in 
situations of short supply, delayed supply, irregular supply or no supply. 
 This assumption will be examined using the empirical evidence of 
this research.1  
                                                         
1 The quality of management and the institutional and governance environments are 
always key factors in organisational performances. This is true for FHCL as well. 
However, this paper does not examine these factors. The objective here is to examine 
one unique dimension of performance, which is resource dependency. 
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Fiji Hardwood Corporation Limited (FHCL) 
 
 The Ministry of Forests was responsible for the development and 
maintenance of mahogany plantations between the 1960s and 1997 
(MPETC, 2012). In the 1980s and 1990s, government decided to reform 
its public enterprises. Accordingly in 1996, a study was carried out to as-
certain the viability of establishing a hardwood plantation corporation 
based on the successful transition of the softwood plantations into Fiji 
Pine Limited. The study recommended corporatisation (FAO, 2002).  
 In March 1998, FHCL was established as a GCC to administer the 
commercialisation of the mahogany resource. In early 1999, FHCL 
sought listing on the local stock exchange to go public. During the same 
period, it also sought a strategic partner to acquire its 40 percent shares. 
Digitaki (1999: 27) established that the decision was to be endorsed by 
the cabinet in early February 1999 but landowners were not convinced 
and were uncomfortable in handing over their land to FHCL. The FHCL 
held 104 leases with 215 mataqalis (customary family groups). Seven of 
these leases were held with the state  (MPETC 2012). Landowner reluc-
tance led to a new proposal which offered shares to individual mataqali 
members at highly discounted prices from the 10 percent shares that was 
to be offered to the public. This enabled the mataqali members to buy 
shares through a holding company. The 10 percent shares were later 
gifted to the mataqali members through the holding company.  
 The interest in Fiji’s mahogany plantations travelled far given the 
belief that Fiji holds the world’s largest mahogany plantations. Holding 
up a mahogany sapling, a fifty-two year old prawn farmer’s wife ex-
claimed, 'this is what everyone is fighting over… we never knew these 
trees were worth so much money' (Frank, 2000). Logging companies call 
this species the ‘king mahogany’ because this species can be used to 
process a wider variety of products ranging from boardroom panelling to 
yacht decks to furniture. As many became aware of the value of mahog-
any, fights over claiming and/or making use of it, soared. One such event 
is related to the bidding competition of mahogany timber rights. On 13 
September 2000, a Wall Street Journal article (by Robert Frank) surprised 
many people when it revealed the link between the pre-2000 coup ma-
hogany negotiations and the May 2000 coup. At one time, the 2000 coup 
instigator was the chairman of the FHCL board. The May 2000 coup set 
off waves of unrest throughout the region. According to ABC Radio Na-
tional (2004), 'mahogany had a part to play in the many complex factors 
and forces behind the coup, including the personal opportunism of coup 
leader'. 
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 Another ongoing issue for FHCL was land insecurity. Land is cen-
tral to any development of forest plantations. In Fiji, management of ma-
hogany has repercussions on the development of hardwood plantations 
since land as well as its ownership forms an important part of the Fijian 
society. Notably, tenure in Fiji does not necessarily imply land security. 
In addition, while the sound set up of legal and government systems in 
Fiji provide investors with a good level of comfort, the political upsets of 
1987, 2000 and 2006 do otherwise. Land security is tied to national sta-
bility. This is a condition through which the landowners and the lease 
holders or land tenants can be given a surety by the government and the 
other associated organisations that the terms of their rights will be com-
plied with (FAO, 2002). FHCL leased forty-eight acres of an eighty-six 
acre land mass (The Fiji Times, 22 Dec. 2006). 
 The Native Land Trust Board (NLTB) is the party that is capable of 
assuring the rights of lessees (the lease holders). The NLTB was estab-
lished by the British colonial government in the 1940s. As a custodian for 
all indigenous land in Fiji, NLTB is responsible for leasing out mataqali 
land and keeps records of owners and the land they act for (FAO, 2002). 
The assurance of rights, however, must be supported by Fiji’s legal sys-
tem. NLTB is the independent third party that comes between the inves-
tor/lease holders and the landowners. It is mandated to manage leased 
land, hence holds the institutional memory on what has been agreed to. 
These agreements outlive the individuals involved. 
 The key challenge for the industry have been the protesting land-
owners. Landowners often stage protests to take back the trees which oc-
cupy their land even when the subject land is leased by the government 
(Frank, 2000). The second CEO of FHCL explained the FHCL-landowner 
problems when interviewed by Tabureguci (2004) as FHCL being unable 
to access these plantations. Access gets limited because of unresolved is-
sues over crop ownership. Plantations are also not accessible when land-
owners become sceptical about revenue distribution after harvest. Then 
there are doubts on the legality of certain leases which makes it difficult 
for FHCL to access land for harvesting. Landowners also lack under-
standing and need to be educated on what exactly the tenant-landlord re-
lationship should be.  
 The inability to deal directly with the landowners is another prob-
lem. The involvement of NLTB in the transactions has not been of much 
help since landowners do not directly see the money so paid at times 
when the tenant pays the money to the NLTB. 
 Landowners have also always been wary of government’s decision 
to privatise the hardwood industry. In 1998, the people of Vusena (near 
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Navua) sued the government on its decision to privatise the hardwood in-
dustry (Digitaki, 1998). Feeling unfairly compensated, a villager ex-
plained: 'we took care of these trees all our lives… now we want some-
thing in return' (Frank, 2000). A chief of the Naimasimasi village ex-
plained their situation to Feizkhah (2001) as follows: at first there was 
work (clearing the forest and planting) for the villagers but the situation 
changed after a while; at that time the villagers did not give much thought 
to the forest but in the mid 1990s when they came to know about the 
value of mahogany, they 'resolved to get a share of the treasure'. The 
chief justified: 'its for our young people… They should have something 
for the future' (Feizkhah, 2001: 21).  
 The landowners have also staged a few roadblocks. For instance, 
two landowning units of Tailevu (in Viti Levu) organised roadblocks to 
claim compensation. The Mataqali Rara of Naimasimasi Village in 
Tailevu also demanded back their thirty-eight acre land leased to FHCL 
on which mahogany was planted. They justified that this land was re-
served for them by their forefathers, arguing that the company planted 
mahogany without their permission.  
 Some landowners have even taken the government to court. For ex-
ample, the chief of the Nukurua clan took a legal action against the gov-
ernment. It claimed that the government failed to honour the terms of the 
deal. Nukurua holds the largest and oldest of the fourteen mahogany plan-
tations. The clans of Nukurua stood divided. ABC Radio National (2004) 
elaborated on the relationship between landowners and government as 
follows. Unlike another clan, one clan cooperated with the government. 
This clan operates a small logging company. Not discouraged by the 
court case event, the leader of this clan went ahead to sign up on the gov-
ernment’s new mahogany plan. In return, they were promised better rent, 
a percentage of money from log sales as well as other benefits. Since 
then, this clan has been involved with the mahogany industry in terms of 
harvest. The clan leader explained that they had to start somewhere. In his 
view, the only way to start somewhere was to give their land for harvest 
and commercial trials. The clan-operated company rose from humble be-
ginnings. The once simple company which used to work with outdated 
equipment and poorly skilled workers now possesses an expensive heavy 
machine (a skidder) to extract logs from the forest.  
 There is yet another clan that sought compensation from the gov-
ernment as well as from the NLTB. This clan’s multi-million dollar court 
case sought compensation for loss of indigenous timber and the suspected 
adverse effects on the environment such as discolouring of streams. In 
addition, the clan claimed that the government failed to honour the under-
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standing that landowners would have the right to buy back the trees on 
maturity. In a reaction before the hearing of the case, the government and 
FHCL organised roadshows in rural areas. During these roadshows, they 
not only explained the plans for mahogany but also indicated how these 
would benefit the landowners. The roadshows did get most of the land-
owners back on their side.  
 Apart from land rental, landowners also worry about income relat-
ing to working on plantations. FAO (2002) describes landowner fears re-
lating to income as follows. What complicates matters related to land ten-
ure is landowner expectations. It took ten to fifteen years to establish ma-
hogany plantations. To the local rural community, this meant a major 
source of income with a rise in living standards. The rural community 
soon grew to rely on the plantation establishment but there was yet an-
other ten to twenty year waiting period for the completion of the estab-
lishment period. During this period, there was little employment on forest 
plantations, which resulted in a fall in income. This created worries and 
job insecurities for the local rural communities. A Joint Australia/Fiji Re-
view Team (1986) also highlighted landowner income related issues as a 
key matter - income received from harvesting timber was hardly more 
than moderate; it was also irregular and only received during harvesting 
times. The team noted that even this was not the case because harvesting 
jobs were specialised in nature and required skilled workers and capital 
intensive harvesting plants given the topography and soil conditions on 
plantations; the latter displaced manual labour. One cable hauler unit, for 
example, would be adequate for all steeper areas of a plantation, eliminat-
ing the need for a number of workers.  
 Clearly, there were no instant riches in this industry. ABC Radio 
National (2004) understood this and stated that waiting for decades for 
the reward of big money promised in return for using their land has 
driven landowners restless. This in turn adversely affected their direct 
participation in economic activities. Landowners were thus pushing for 
concepts such as a 'trust'. They needed to be told that they 'have a greater 
position than what they really have' (ABC Radio National, 2004). Ac-
cording to a timber executive and a former Fijian diplomat, 'we have this 
asset that people learn has tremendous value… I’m afraid that unless we 
get a solution that’s agreeable to Fijians, it’s going to create more insta-
bility' (as cited in Frank, 2000).  
 In 2001, NLTB had designs on mahogany, hoping to buy back 
leases on all plantations. Feizkhah (2001) noted that the NLTB wanted to 
look for its own investment partner to cut and market timber. The then 
NLTB General Manager justified this: 'it’s all for the landowners. We are 
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fighting for them' (as cited in Feizkhah, 2001: 22). He complained that it 
is hard to understand why certain landowner groups 'seem to say we are 
against them. They need the board’s protection more than ever… With 
the troubles at the moment, there are a lot of sharks about'. However, with 
complains of inefficiency, secretiveness and indifference to landowner is-
sues, many landowners prefer to 'swim with sharks then trust their official 
godfather' ((as cited in Feizkhah, 2001: 22). 
 Landowners often raised concerns about the way the NLTB distrib-
uted incomes from leased lands. The NLTB took out 20 percent for its 
administration fee and then paid the remaining to the landowners with 25 
percent of this going to the Chief, and others getting smaller shares. Ordi-
nary clan members numbering sixty or more ended up with a pittance. A 
high chief complained that, 'most of the top chairs, they just want to fill 
their pockets… That’s why we decided to kick out those people and go 
with the American company ourselves' (as cited in Feizkhah, 2001: 22). 
Landowners do hold the trump card. Feizkhah noted that with a grin, the 
high chief explained: 'we will just block the road to the plantation. With-
out an agreement with us, nobody will be able to get in to cut the mahog-
any – unless they have helicopters' (2001: 22).  
 FHCL is said to be the most controversial of all GCCs. Marred with 
landowner and political interference, and the 2000 coup after-effects, 
FHCL was never entirely left on its own to function commercially from 
the outset. It was never really given a commercial environment to work 
in. A number of CEOs left the company out of frustration; the enterprise 
did not have sufficient control over its activities. Every now and then, 
managements have had to consult and seek approvals from the key stake-
holder – the landowners - and this was never easy. The entity also was not 
without continuous government and other forms of political interferences. 
The government did not receive any dividend from FHCL. FHCL re-
mained dependent on government funding and/or guarantees.  
 Nonetheless, the lucrative resource of mahogany is recognised by all 
stakeholders. The Government has started a new reform. Under this, the 
role of the FHCL will be confined to that of a forest manager - it will only 
be engaged in planting and maintenance of plantations until maturity. But 
the planting and maintenance functions will be contracted out to the land-
owners. The industry will operate under a new licensing regime whereby 
the processing and marketing aspects of the industry will be handled by 
new license holders who would be forestry experts. A number of stake-
holders, including FHCL, expressed their reluctance towards the new set 
up. However, the choice for them has been limited given the environ-
ment.  
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 In terms of financial performance, from its inception until 2003, 
FHCL remained dependent on government funding. It was a 
disappointing performer as it did not show any financial progress since its 
inception in 1998 until 2007 (MPETC, 2009c). As in 2003, in 2006, 
FHCL was again technically insolvent. Returns did not flow in as ex-
pected. FHCL reported fluctuating losses, losses being the highest in 
2007. It only reported profits twice between 2008 and 2010. 2008 was the 
first year of profits for FHCL, largely a result of putting in place financial 
controls, introducing internal restructure, and identifying key targets. As 
at 31 January 2011, debts of FHCL totalled about $26 million. Out of 
this, about $16.8 million was guaranteed by government (Nasiko, 2011). 
FHCL was also behind in its loan repayments (to the Fiji National Provi-
dent Fund). Because FHCL is about 80 to 90 percent export based even 
when it is yet to fully develop its export market, global crisis also has an 
adverse impact on it.  Table 1 shows key financial ratios for the year 
2009. 
 
Table 1: Financial Ratios (2009) 
Asset  
Utilisation 
Liabilities:Total 
Assets 
Cash  
Ratio 
Average ROA 
FY2002-2009 
9% 15% 0.20 -1.30% 
(Source: ADB, 2011) 
 
 Asset utilisation ratio measures management effectiveness in using a 
company’s assets in its daily operations. The higher the ratio, the better. 
FHCL’s asset utilisation ratio in 2009 was at a low 9 percent. This means 
it earned just 9 cents for each dollar of asset held. 
 Liabilities : total assets ratio reflects at the portion of a company’s 
assets financed through debt. The higher the ratio, the higher the risk. 
FHCL’s liabilities : total assets ratio in 2009 was 15 percent but this was 
because most of FHCL’s borrowing was sourced from government or 
government owned enterprises. 
 Cash ratio is a measure of a company's liquidity. The cash ratio of 
FHCL in 2009 was at the lower side - below 1. While a cash ratio below 1 
is not necessarily bad, holding smaller amounts of cash may reflect inef-
fective asset utilisation, in FHCL’s case its asset utilisation is also poor. 
 Return on Assets (ROA) indicates the efficiency of the management 
in using its company’s assets in generating earnings. The higher the ROA, 
the better. For FCHL, however, instead of earning, it lost 1.3 cents for 
each dollar invested in assets.  
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 Table 2 presents the net profit and revenue figures of FHCL for the 
years 1999-2011. 
 
Table 2: Revenue and Net Profit after Tax (FJD,000) 
Year Revenue Net Profit 
1999 5 -3,982 
2000 57 -2,938 
2001 13 -2,972 
2002 361 -1,842 
2003 3,371 -3,669 
2004 6,017 -2,354 
2005 14,445 -2,065 
2006 14,284 -6,792 
2007 13,433 -25,860 
2008 19,658 1,171 
2009 15,903 -3,001 
2010 25,300 1,634 
2011 na -164 
(na – not available at the time of research ) 
(Source: MPETC, 2012) 
   
 The table shows that the FHCL continued to report losses except in 
2008 and 2010. The table also shows fluctuations in revenue with periods 
of improvement between 2002 and 2005. Naturally the company could 
not pay any dividend to the government during the period.  
 Sectoral performance can shed some light on how the industry, 
within which the FHCL operates, performed in recent years. The key sec-
toral performance datas is the sectors contribution to GDP. The overall 
forestry sector's contribution declined in 2009 but improved in 2010 
(Ministry of Finance, 2011). 
 
Major Findings 
 
 FHCL was riddled with numerous problems to the date of this re-
search. It operated in losses/generated insignificant profits and was not in 
any position to pay dividends to the government. The major issue that 
plagued FHCL was heavy dependence on the most powerful stakeholders 
- the owners of resources from whom cooperation was continuously 
sought but without much success. Other issues included dependence on 
natural resources which are susceptible to natural disasters and pests, fi-
nancial dependence on the government, the lack of extensive and creative 
marketing, and lack of forethought on diversification. The above led to 
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little to no improvement in FHCL’s performance, at times even leading to 
worsened situations. While there were little improvements such as small 
profits in recent years, the persistent problems overshadowed such small 
gains. 
 The key assumption of the Resource Dependence theory of organi-
sations responding to and becoming dependent on those organisations 
which control and provide it with its critical resources, make much sense 
in FHCL’s case. Empirical evidence confirms that FHCL is entirely de-
pendent on its key resource providers who are the landlords of the critical 
resource on which mahogany is planted. 
 Without casting any judgment on the merits of the landowners ac-
tions, the fact remains that mahogany landowners blocking the roads to 
plantations and taking legal actions directly impact the processing com-
pany. During the period, landowners often staged protests to take back the 
trees which occupied their land, even though the Government had leases 
over the same. The second CEO of FHCL explained that FHCL was often 
unable to access the plantations because of unresolved issues over crop 
ownership. Such situations make not only the FHCL weak, but also 
strengthen the position of the resource providers 
 
Concluding Remarks 
 
 This study confirms the validity of Resource Dependence theory for 
the mahogany industry in Fiji. The Resource Dependence theory points 
out that the organisation which provides key resources will be more pow-
erful than the dependent organisation given that as a supplier it owns and 
controls the critical resources. When the critical resources are raw materi-
als or inputs to the production process, the production process of the de-
pendent organisation will be affected adversely in situations of irregular 
or no supply leading to a waste of production time and/or lower produc-
tion levels. These in turn can lead the dependent organisation not being 
able to meet customer demand, losing out on sales and thus profits. This 
implies that a given organisation’s performance very much depends on 
the organisation that provides it with its critical resource. In short, the de-
pendent organisation is at the mercy of the powerful supplier of critical 
resources. This was clearly the case at FHCL. 
 The entire set of activities and the motivations underpinning these 
need to be clearly understood and addressed to every stakeholder's satis-
faction in such circumstances. In this, a number of strategies need to be 
utilised. Purely a legalistic approach may not produce the desired result in 
the setting in which the mahogany industry exists in the country.  
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